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How do Indian firms cope with a crisis? Earnings management 
characteristics of CNX Nifty 100 companies  
ABSTRACT: An analysis of Indian CNX Nifty 100 companies across the last two recessions 
or the Global Financial Crises highlights practices of earnings management. The crisis response 
uncovers the perils of opportunistic earnings management as crises affect balance sheets in 
FY2007 and FY2012.  The study proves indications of Performance measurement hypothesis 
yet primarily only Opportunistic accruals with negative correlation between Post crisis and 
precrisis accruals and accruals increasing in the post crisis year. Operating accruals of the firm 
are synonymous with its Working Capital investment. These translate into dependencies on 
Working Capital investments to finance growth.  Earnings management impairs a firm’s ability 
to smoothen earnings during a continued crisis. It instead resonates with the build-up of cookie 
jar reserves in the bigger companies and those that invest in Corporate Governance. The 
presence of negative accruals may show effects of high growth and slack corporate governance. 
Banking firms respond with a more sophisticated earnings management strategy where Loan 
Loss provisions significantly increase with increase in Cash profits.    
1. The Earnings Management Problem  
Financial reporting continues to become sophisticated and is consistently harmonized 
internationally. There is evidence, however, that firms worldwide continue to engage in 
accruals based earnings management and real activity earnings management.    
This also corresponds to a general reluctance on part of managers to report bad news and to 
report in line with or beating expectations from their own guidance and analysts’ forecasts.    
Accruals are a significant indicator of earnings quality along with persistence, smoothness, 
timeliness, loss avoidance and frequently used for verification in the literature with events of 
earnings restatement and enforcement actions by SEC(USA), SEBI(India) or other regulators. 
(Dechow et al, 2010)   
Bonus contracts also necessitate real activity earnings management as does evidence of 
counteracting business cycle impact on the firm.  We focus on available evidence through 
application of the discussions in accrual based earnings management.    
Earnings management literature relies heavily on the Jones (1991) model. Similar to the 
devolution of methodology in Event Study literature (Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay, 1997), 
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different variations in methodology have been focused around maintaining and improving the 
power of the test and a recognition of the limitations of the test while its continuing 
effectiveness in isolating discretionary accruals.    
Operating accruals of the firm are synonymous with its Working Capital investment.  Both 
industry based models and the generalized models have been applied to the problem of isolating 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Competing Earnings management theory can be 
variously applied and extended to therefore, forecast companies’ idiosyncratic and market wide 
responses to information flow and macroeconomic factors to its version of the truth in 
providing earnings guidance, reacting to good and bad news and creating cookie jar reserves 
for the future. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explains partly the managers’ 
increasing requirements for a discretion in reporting earnings and smoothing earnings 
irrespective of industry.   
1.1 Earnings management in Banks   
Banks have been found to exercise a similar discretion in providing and renewing Loan Loss 
Reserves to create a managerial control option in reported earnings. While current research 
ignores banks in Earnings management analysis, we collate earnings management analyses by 
banks and present a consolidated finding comparing the entire NSE 100 sample. Current 
research also finds the role for AFS securities following on Realized gains from Securities 
which we also attempt as a proxy for Indian Banks in the Nifty 50 and Junior 50 indices.  
Despite its recent adoption, Fair value accounting is unlikely to show up in Indian Banks’ 
reported data although some data on outstanding derivatives’ positions is available and 
securitization is also expected to add more power to manage growth financing to banking 
balance sheets.    
1.2 Dealing with Crises   
Cyclical recessions and non-cyclical crisis events such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 
generate a similar response from firms within the means available to managers to tweak their 
financial reporting and minimize the impact of the crises on the firm’s stakeholders and future 
investing and financing activities.  We use a sample of the 100 largest and most liquid Indian 
firms listed on the NSE, represented in the Nifty 100 index. As of March 2015, the index 
represented more than three quarters of the Indian market capitalization. We use crisis years of 
2007 and 2012 to measure and report the earnings management activities of Indian Non  
Financial Firms and Banks and review the results in light of existing evidence and for the 
benefit of follow on research in the area.  The analysis and the literature recognizes that 
quarterly earnings announcements facilitate the smoother management of earnings 
management strategies but as it relies on a large sample, it expects sufficient power in the tests 
to ignore other announcement effects in a consideration of annual earnings announcement 
windows.    
Final earnings announcements of the year are likely to be more definitive regarding the 
company’s overall earnings management intentions and avoid seasonal fluctuations.  As 
Indian firms follow an April – March Fiscal year, we also follow their March fiscal 
announcements. We also expect in general that changes in accounting guidelines over the 
years would have reduced overall opportunities for earnings management. However, the 
corresponding likely increase of intangible assets during the period would correspond to some 
increasing opportunity for earnings management as well.  The analysis precludes the final 
introduction of IFRS as a mandatory requirement for Indian firms though internationally 
focused and corporate governance aware firms invest in IFRS based financial reporting. We 
also rely on a consensus that informativeness of Financial reporting has not decreased in the 
period of 2002-2015 which data we employ in the analysis. Related research in the area that 
might be helpful includes a discussion on earnings quality by Dechow et al (2010) and the 
discussion by McNichols and Stubbens(2008) on the role of Earnings management in relation 
to investment activity envisaged by the firm.    
  
Follow on research can show the impact of national accounting guidelines, IFRS, Guidance 
and Forecast revisions and pre-IPO or pre-merger valuation motivations on the Earnings 
management strategy of the firm and relate to its expectation management of stock returns.     
The following section updates the literature review on the subject. Section 3 proceeds to present 
our hypotheses. In Experimental Design we present the Data and Methodology. In Section 5 
we present the results after applying the Earnings management model to isolate discretionary 
accruals in the designated crises years. In the end we discuss the conclusions from our data and 
the possible implications for the subject.    
2. Literature Review   
Earnings Management has been tested empirically across all international accounting regimes. 
It is seen to be lower in common law countries because of better investor protection (Leuz et 
al, 2003). Real Earnings Management becomes more possible with lower discretionary 
expenses.    
Asia and other higher growth countries are found to lie in an independent cluster with both civil 
and common law characteristics with significant accrual based earnings management (ibid.). 
These dimensions in earnings management advantage from Corporate Finance literature of 
LaPorta et al (2002) relating Corporate Governance, monitoring and investor protection and 
legal frameworks in host countries.    
Accruals are frequently used for verification in the literature with events of earnings 
restatement and enforcement actions by SEC (USA), SEBI (India) or other regulators. (Dechow 
et al, 2010)  
Dechow et al (2010) and McNichols and Stubbens (2008) discuss the role of Earnings 
management in relation to investment activity envisaged by the firm.   
The extent of earnings management using accruals may depend on the extent of ownership 
control in the company. Beating forecasts (Earnings surprise), a frequent phenomenon in India, 
however, is not seen as a motivating factor for increasing institutional ownership, as in Sen 
(2009).    
The Jones (1991) model introduced a linear relation between Total Accruals and Changes in 
Sales and Property, Plant and Equipment. The effect of Account receivables from Credit sales 
is subsequently accounted for in the Modified Jones model by Dechow (1995) and remains the 
bedrock of earnings management literature.     
This model replaced the Total Accruals approach and Industry model approaches as succinctly 
explained in Dechow (1995). The detailed model is presented in section 4.3.    
While Non-discretionary accruals relate to the operating characteristics of the business, 
discretionary accruals reverse out in a few years. Corrections to the modified jones models in 
the literature by Dechow et al (2011) incorporating reversals in the very next year and by use 
of matched firms by Kothari et al(2005) are found to be exceedingly complex without 
additional benefits of power or reliability. Other mechanisms to separate accruals also 
frequently underperform the Modified Jones model and thus the same as typified in equations 
(1) and (2) is primarily used on the sample here to separate discretionary accruals. The reversal 
of discretionary accruals in fact improves the statistical validity of the test and improves its 
power over a larger sample.     
The model remains robust and the most effective in discerning the role of accruals after 
controlling for long term growth and the return on assets. The growth variation is realized 
because of dependence of growth on the Working Capital investment outlays. The success of 
the Modified Jones model however argues that the model may be biased against growth 
companies seen as reporting higher discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2000).   
This study separates the Discretionary accruals for the firms as per the model. Using 
Discretionary accruals thus available, the literature goes on to implement market model event 
studies based in Ross’ APT in DeFond and Jimbalvo(1994) and estimate the influence of 
independent components of nondiscretionary accruals after controlling for expected growth as 
in McNichols(2000).    
However, the attempt at specifying specific accruals tests has failed repeatedly in the literature. 
Additionally, even the use of annual year end data as in our study has to contend with clustered 
announcements at the end of the year and it is difficult to assume a parametric relation even 
after specifying different bases to tackle event contamination and it is virtually impossible to 
isolate the effects of specific accruals except for that may be argued in theory. For example, 
changes in receivables are specific to the credit policy (easy or discriminatory or other 
generous) adopted by each firm and even price changes of the product may show up in higher 
sales and higher discretionary accruals.     
Kothari et al(2015) process the available models for discretionary accruals and real activity 
manipulation to affect the causality in valuation of pre SEO companies’ (IPO) valuation. 
Similarly the use of this earnings management analysis will be useful in discovering valuation 
issues prior to a firm planning higher inorganic investments i.e. large public and private 
mergers and acquisitions (Mao et al, 2015).  However issues of valuation are more affected by 
real activity manipulation, namely by influencing consistent opportunistic reduction of 
intangible expenses and SGA expenses prior to IPO. Investors’ trust is more affected by accrual 
based earnings management (Hewitt et al, 2015).    
Discretion available to managers allows us to account for the Basu asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient (Ball et al, 2013) or the negative coefficient to bad news in earnings that allows for 
slower digestion of negative earnings impact news that ties in with accounting conservatism.    
Dechow (2012) reinforces a negative correlation in discretionary accruals time series as they 
are expected to be reversed. Richardson et al (2005) describe earnings persistence as a criterion 
for discerning whether accruals are reliable or not. This implies that firms may be marked as 
unreliable after having used opportunistic accruals to trump up earnings as reversals ensue. On 
the other hand, this increases the tendency of firms to engage in downward earnings 
management as they understate earnings in good times and that allows them to smooth earnings 
during crises. We analyze our sample to affirm if specific firms can be seen to be implementing 
downward earnings management or if they are engaging primarily  in opportunistic  accruals 
management.    
Earnings management motivations are frequently explained in agency theory.  This includes 
Earnings forecasts and earnings surprises, differentiating positive and negative surprises and 
the management propensity to influence bonuses and manage bad news slowly as measured in 
the Basu asymmetry coefficient (Ball et al, 2013).   
Earnings management will depend on institutional ownership (Ghosh, 2011), the presence of 
international investors, accounting conservatism, impairment and loss events, and analyst 
forecasts or management guidance. Dechow et al(2011) and others use the list of SEC 
enforcement actions to identify a sample of firms engaging in accruals misstatements and try 
to predict characteristics of misstating firms using F statistics to get rid of chances of Type I 
errors in the model.    
Working Capital Investments  
As mentioned earlier, the formulation for Accruals in Equation (2) in Section 4.3 refers the 
Working Capital Investment of the firm. As such, this formulation is likely to be highly skewed 
in growth times as firms rely on Working Capital Investments to increase the PPE investments 
of the firm. This is additionally evidenced strongly in our sample of Indian firms.   
Banking Firms  
Oosterbosch (2000) presents a comprehensive literature review of Earnings management 
practices in banking firms and tests findings of earnings management thru Loan loss provisions 
after the introduction of IFRS in small and large banks. Banks valuation and reporting models 
specify regulatory effects and a reliability of operating profit measures. We therefore rely on 
banks’ specific accrual measures from the literature in Loan loss provisions, and trading gains.  
In a regulator motivated study, Meisel (2013) applies an industry specific model to banks and 
compares for valuation effects in banking firms planning mergers and merger defense. Ahmed 
(1999) find no expected earnings management effect in banks and explains the negative 
correlation of Loan loss provisions to future earnings and stock returns allowing banks to focus 
on Loan loss provisions (countercyclical and not procyclical as expected in earnings 
management) for capital management.    
Event Studies  
Earnings management motivations and information flows relationships are also a frequently 
tested subject in the literature. These models rely on event  study based parametric and 
nonparametric tests to establish relationship between derivatives pricing, analyst coverage and 
the accruals anomaly to investigate relationships with accruals.  Meeting expectations on a 
regular basis may for example, improve abnormal returns in calibrated event studies. Also, for 
companies forced to produce a negative earnings surprise, there may be a motivation to manage 
earnings downward and create cookie jar reserves for future periods. This has been explored 
by Dechow et al for firms reporting zero or negative earnings, showing up as a very asymmetric 
distribution around 0 earnings. Firms positively manipulating earnings also end up over 
investing in the period with higher discretionary accruals.    
Earnings management was also definitively changed for cross listed firms after the introduction 
of SOX in the US in 2002.  Also, audit firms are seen to increase their fee around increasing 
earnings management. MNCs in India (Ghosh, 2011) are seen to employ international auditors 
with lower monitoring resulting in higher discretionary accruals. Earnings management will 
thus depend on institutional ownership, the presence of international investors, accounting 
conservatism, impairment and loss events, and analyst forecasts or management guidance. 
More importantly it has significant linkages in the Corporate Governance literature and a 
significant indicator of the Corporate Governance score of the candidate firms.    
We complete the literature review as we began with another application of discretionary 
accruals in the earnings management literature with Barth et al(2013) that attempt a market 
model based earnings transparency measure, where they find in favor of a lower cost of capital 
reward for firms that can prove earnings transparency. The new IFRS mandate in the 
meanwhile is expected to homogenize Financial reporting completely after its launch in 2019 
and may necessitate a reevaluation of any firm specific measures and traditional earnings 
management (Barth et al, 2012). However, Oosterbosch (2000) confirms that sophisticated 
earnings management users in large banks continue to prefer earnings management to retain 
investor trust.   
  
3. Hypotheses  
The study evaluates four major hypotheses for Indian firms employing accruals based earnings 
management.   
Hypothesis 1: Crisis events will expose particular earnings management strategies. Proactive 
strategies (Performance measurement) can be compared with Reactive earnings 
management (Opportunistic accruals).   
If there is proactive earnings management, there may be no change in the firms’ EM strategies.  
It is reasonable to expect that the reversal of accruals to force ill prepared firms into a reactive 
crisis of earnings in their post crisis reports in FY 2007 and FY 2012.    
  
Hypothesis 2: Indian firms’ will reflect Earnings Management strategies more suited to 
growth firms.  
Crisis response will be heightened in Indian firms because of the pressures of growth.    
    
Hypothesis 3: Both Banking firms and NonFinancial firms will exhibit complementary 
earnings management strategies. Banking firms will respond with more sophisticated 
Earnings management as adverse credit decisions lead the onset of a crisis.   
In the presence of basic data on Loan Loss provisions and trading gains on securities the 
analysis shows the presence of earnings management in the financial firms (tested in only 
Banking firms) as being more sophisticated than that in the sample of Non- financial firms.    
  
Hypothesis 4: Indian firms primarily engage in Performance measurement using 
discretionary accruals if they have the requisite size.    
As tested in Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) henceforth GKW, the discretionary accrual 
amounts and their relationship to earnings can be used to tie in the firms’ use of discretionary 
accruals as Performance Measurement vis a vis Opportunistic Accruals management 
hypothesis.   
This will be shown by the presence of a negative correlation in the discretionary accruals in the 
pre-crisis and post crisis years.  However, the negative correlation is additionally significant 
evidence of Opportunistic Accruals management if the direction of the accruals is higher in the 
post crises year.   
4. Experimental Design    
4.1 Sample Selection  
The Nifty 100 index constituents form the sample of firms in the study. The popular Nifty 50 
and Nifty junior 50 indices together account for the Nifty 100 firms. These firms are spread 
across 12 sectors and as for March 2015 account for 78% of the free float of the National Stock 
Exchange in India. After excluding other financial firms, we end up with 76 firms and 12 banks 
and calculate the accrual measures based on the Modified jones model weighted by total assets 
at the beginning of year to take care of endogeneity and minimize size effects in the pooled 
regression. For each firm, we get Financial statement data from the Bloomberg database for the 
period 2001-2015.    
Some firms need to be excluded for non-availability of key Financial statement data such as 
M&M (receivables) and Bharat Forge (total assets). As Firm years are separated later based on 
crises events in 2001, 2006 and 2011, we use Financial data as available only when completely 
available for both pre and post crisis years. Other firm years are collated together to compute 
the OLS coefficients in (1).   
We neglect the small impact of taxes in the calculation of Total Accruals in the data. Apart 
from the effect being small in size, most tax aligned manipulation of earnings is likely to be 
included in real activity Earnings management and we concern ourselves with Accruals based 
earnings management.   
We also appreciate our limitation of this study in that in the style of Bartov(2003) we would 
prefer using 10-Q and equivalent Indian disclosures to closely track earnings management.  
However, it is also true that Earning management is intuitive to the firms’ management and 
usually advantages from earnings seasonality and priorities. Thus, an experiment design with 
quarterly statements may not be ideal for Earnings management analysis.   
  
  
  
4.2 Data   
The 76 non-financial firms, yield a total of 692 eligible firm years.    
As 2001 is usually the first available year in the Bloomberg data files, we are unable to use the 
crisis year in 2001 in the specification. The scaling requires last year’s Total Assets to form the 
variables. This is because the development of the Accrual model realizes the previous years’ 
closing balance sheet value (Total Assets) as the best company datum to weight Accruals and 
Revenue and Property Plant and Equipment data assigned in Equation (2).   
We calculate weighted data for Total Accruals and the two Independent variables for the 692 
firm years using the values of Revenues, Receivables, Current Assets,   
Current Liabilities, Cash and equivalent, Short term debt, Total assets (t-1 year) as well as 
PP&E, directly available from Bloomberg or within reasonable permutations from available 
fields without restating earnings or applying further approximations. This meant sometimes 
computing the value of Total Assets for all years based on Net Current Assets + Total 
NonCurrent Assets.   
The sample of 692 Firm years has corresponding 109 crisis observation pairs, which are tested 
for difference in discretionary accruals using Paired t tests. The crises reactions can be 
separately analyzed for 2012(2011) and 2007(2006) with 64 and 45 pairs respectively.    
Interestingly at least 191 firm years show negative Total accruals even when a -10% TA level 
is used, signifying a heavy reliance of large growth companies in the index. These growth 
companies habitually rely on   
Current Liability accruals and significant PPE investments even though the amount of 
intangibles is increasing that may also be invested in Corporate Governance.    
In our sample of Banks, the available data set of 131 firm years, we collate different OLS data 
on Loan Loss provisions scaled by total loans, non-performing Loans (also scaled by  Total 
Loans) (which we drop for intractability), Income before Taxes and Loss provisions scaled by 
Total assets (IBITt )as well as trading gains scaled by the IBIT. This data correspondingly has 
20 crisis observations, (20 pre crises year and 20 Post crises years).   
The Fiscal year returns for the Nifty 100 members are taken corresponding to available 
Financial Statement data. Where such correspondence is not available, we are left with 668 
eligible firm years for the decomposition models of Fiscal year returns.    
Descriptive statistics of the data series in each case from the estimation of Discretionary 
accruals, to impact of Crises years on Discretionary accruals and NonDiscretionary accruals 
estimates are presented with the results from each stage of the design.   
4.3 Methodology   
The Modified Jones model in Dechow (1995) is implemented as under:   
TAt = 1(1/At-1) + 1( REVt - RECt) /A t-1  + 2(PPEt) /At-1          ………(1)   
TAt = ( CAt – CLt – CASHt + STDEBTt – DEPTNt)/ASSETt-1      ………(2)   
Firm years are collated together to compute the OLS coefficients in (1).   
The Non-discretionary accruals are directly estimated in the above form as the total estimable 
accruals and the OLS regression across firm years yields errors as  Discretionary accruals.   
The Discretionary accruals separated from the Modified Jones (1991) formulation as error can 
thus be estimated.   
The small impact of taxes in the calculation of Total Accruals in the data is neglected.   
The study follows annual March fiscal announcements. Informativeness of Financial reporting 
has not decreased in the period of 2001-2015 which data we employ in the analysis.   Estimation 
of discretionary accruals have been assessed for Power and relevance variously by Dechow et 
al (2011) and Kothari et al(2005, 2015). While Non-discretionary accruals relate to the 
operating characteristics of the business, discretionary accruals reverse out after a few years. 
Corrections to the modified jones models in the literature by Dechow et al (2011) incorporating 
reversals in the very next year and by use of matched firms by Kothari et al (2005) were found 
to be exceedingly complex without additional benefits of power or reliability. As already 
discussed in the literature, other mechanisms to separate accruals also frequently underperform 
the Modified Jones model and thus the same as typified in equations (1) and (2) is primarily 
used on the sample here to separate discretionary accruals. The reversal of discretionary 
accruals in fact improves the statistical validity of the test and improves its power over a larger 
sample.    
For the crises pairs, a dummy variable PARTt is employed.  The results of the regression using 
the dummy variable PARTt in a single regression mis specifies the results and we end up with 
increasing non-discretionary accruals in the crisis year.    
As many as 32 firm years out of 64 represent firms increasing their total accruals during the 
crises year. When a separate regression is run for prior and post years models to capture 
different Non-discretionary accrual (NDE or TA) and estimate back the DA from them as error, 
we find the increased accruals showing as expected in the padded Discretionary accruals.    
This difference is tested using a paired t test of these firm years. The Discretionary accruals 
estimated in the overall model are written back into the data and estimated accruals from the 
OLS regression used for Non-Discretionary accruals. These Non- discretionary accruals and 
Discretionary accruals are currently used to estimate their impact on Fiscal year earnings in the 
style of GKW(1996). These Discretionary accruals can be utilized for computing any impact 
on returns in follow on research using the discretionary accruals reported in this  analysis   
As tested in the literature, the discretionary accrual amounts and their relationship to earnings 
can be used to tie in the firms’ use of discretionary accruals as Performance Measurement vis 
a vis Opportunistic Accruals management hypothesis. As per Performance measurement 
hypothesis, correlations between NDE and DA are expected to be negative.   
Also the results are sufficient to signify if Opportunistic accruals may be cause of correlation 
from the direction of increase of accruals. Banks as sophisticated earnings management users 
may additionally show a distinction to confirm the same.   
We analyze our sample to affirm if specific firms can be seen to be implementing downward 
earnings management as per the Performance Measurement hypothesis or if they are engaging 
primarily in opportunistic accruals management. The presence of   
Cookie jar reserves can be cogently tested in subsamples of large firms and also in industry 
wise measures as industry firms may likely follow similar management mantras.    
The sample for banks is run for earnings management on cash profits before accruals and loan 
loss provisions. Loan loss provisions represent by far the most important discretionary accrual 
on Bank balance sheets ad are used directly. Thus, the study operates on scaled LLPt as a ratio 
of overall Loans measured in a regression with two IVs, scaled Trading Gains (scaled by EBIT), 
TRADt and the cash profit scaled by Total Assets of the firm of the same year), IBITt. We also 
use Bloomberg data for NPLs and Trading gains as well as Tier I capital ratios to measure the 
extent of use of discretionary accruals.    
On the non-financial sample we run a test of correlations  between  non-discretionary accruals 
and discretionary accruals. A negative correlation specifies an under reaction to the economic 
shock in the performance measurement hypothesis and conforms to the opportunistic accruals 
management hypothesis for firms that are forcing earnings upward.     
All OLS regressions are run using robust Standard errors in Stata.   
5. Results   
5.1 Preliminary observations of the Non Financial sample   
A simple analysis of the pre-crisis accruals shows a lack of earnings management savvy in 
Indian public corporations as they prefer to depend on  next year’s growing sales instead of 
creating any distance between them and a crisis with a large negative dependence on the 
increasing sales (-24.7%).   
Firms also show more negative dependence  on PPE investments that continues with highly 
significant coefficients in both pre crisis (6.8%) and post crisis years (-8.0%). However, in the 
post crisis years it becomes more discernible that negative accruals are related to higher Capital 
Expenditure and hence growth. This is primarily because the Crisis year forces managements 
to invest a more significant proportion of their Total accruals in Discretionary cookie jar 
reserves. However the Sales coefficient is not found to be significant in either regression.   
However the situation is more a reflection of Corporate Governance practices and the larger 
availability of Cash in each of the firm’s balance sheets balancing larger supplier liabilities.   
5.2 Results from the Non-Financial Sample   
We present the results of the OLS regressions. The DA measurements are included in the results 
of the pooled regression using robust Standard errors.    
The F Statistic of the test is 12 and the PPE variable is significant at greater than 99% level 
with an R2 from the Sales growth and PPE variables of 3.38%    
The relation for estimating back NDA and separating DA is thus   
NDA = -.0002922   -.0097297   *  Salesnewt -.0783686   * PPEt    
The Post crises relation shows a better significance of Sales and a positive coefficient on the 
same, with significantly higher Discretionary accruals    
TA(post) =  -.0222664 + .0786287 * Sales .0800696   * PPEt   
TA(pre) =  .053394 - 0.247006 * Sales - 0. 068012   * PPEt   
Separated pre crisis years show perfect dependence with Sales (t=4.47) and almost 0 
Discretionary accruals.    
Discretionary Accruals rise by 36% of Assets in the year following as firms show Opportunistic 
accruals to claw earnings at level using accruals based earnings management apart from any 
real activity based earnings management not measured here. Paired t-test statistic is 9.15.   
Additional confirmation of negative correlation between Non-discretionary and Discretionary 
accruals at -10% shows a presence of Performance measurement accruals.   
 However, negative accruals between pre and post crisis data with increase in post crisis 
accruals show preponderance of opportunistic accruals management in the post crisis year.  
The conclusion is further strengthened by change of sign on the coefficient of Sales and the 
change of accruals’ denomination to sales in the derived specification. In the post Crises 
specification, PPE is no longer driving accruals as firms use new sales to build up lost accruals 
and likely encourage large discretionary accruals with recovering sales.  
Thus we show that Crisis expose the presence of Performance measurement in Indian firms’, 
yet there is evidence of continuing Opportunistic accruals management. The effects of growth 
are unable to mask the firms’ choice of earnings management. As we see below, Banking firms 
however respond more proactively and accruals reduce in the post crisis years   
5.3 Results from the Financial Sample   
The sample of Financial firms yields significant relationships in OLS regressions with each 
independent variables at the 95% level.     
The LLP increase with EBIT by a coefficient of 8.1% and decrease with reported trading gains 
by 0.11% , both significant at >99.99% level. In the combined regression using PARTt in the 
regression as Dummy with Trading Gains and EBIT, the constant term remains significant as 
expected. The LLP term is significant (t=2.92) but the Trading gains terms with the negative 
coefficient is not significant (t-=1.15). The Dummy Variable for Crisis is not found to be 
significant. We do not attach significance to the combined regression because of paucity of 
data.   
However, for the post crisis sample we are unable to retrieve any significant relationships in 
the chosen variables. There is a decrease in the LLP in both crisis years at a confidence level 
under 90%. However, in the pre-crisis sample again, we note that the accruals, LLPt are 
significantly related to each of the chosen IVs, Trading Gains and the Profit. Banking firms are 
also better practitioners of Earnings management given better tools of Earnings management 
for them.   
6. Conclusions   
The paper shows the strong impact of earnings management in managing crisis year financial 
reporting.   
The ability of firms to grow a base of discretionary accruals in the growth environment lies in 
the ability of firms to disconnect working capital investments as represented by the accruals 
here in from investments for Sales. This also stresses firm balance sheets in later years as these 
discretionary accruals reverse themselves.    
The paper’s results also reflect the recent literature on articulated accruals and real activity 
based earnings management.    
Earnings management has significant linkages in the Corporate Governance literature and a 
significant indicator of the Corporate Governance score of the candidate firms.   
Finally, another significant application of discretionary accruals in future research lies in that 
lower cost of capital reward for firms that can prove earnings transparency.   
   
7. Possible Implications   
Indian firms might benefit from adopting transparent Corporate Governance measures that 
restrict a management’s ability to use accruals opportunistically and focus on effecting investor 
trust. This might reflect in a more widespread adoption of downward earnings management.    
As challenges from the Global Financial crisis translate to more channeled flows of Foreign 
Direct Investment, India stands to benefit from harmonized Financial reporting and investors 
would support businesses that adopt a proactive Performance based Earnings Management 
strategy   
Investors would respond negatively to further volatility in earnings when faced by a crisis and 
this may erode Investor trust and confidence. This ensures that Banks and non-financial firms 
will continue to employ accrual based earnings management.   
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